HENRI BERGSON AND THE MIND BODY PROBLEM: OVERCOMING CARTESIAN DUALISM by Gare, Arran
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 2, 2020 
www.cosmosandhistory.org  165 
 
 
HENRI BERGSON AND THE MIND BODY 





ABSTRACT: There are few philosophers who have been so influential in their own lifetimes and 
had so much influence, only to be subsequently ignored, as Henri Bergson (1859-1941). When in 
April 1922, Bergson debated Einstein on the nature of time, it was Bergson who was far better 
known and respected. Now Einstein’s achievements are known to everyone, but very few people 
outside philosophy departments have even heard of Bergson. Following Friedrich Schelling and 
those he influenced, Bergson targeted the Cartesian dualism that permeates the culture of 
modernity. In doing so, he challenged deep assumptions rooted in and cemented in place by 
Descartes’ philosophy. It this article I will argue that Bergson made considerable progress in this 
attack on Cartesian dualism, and diverse philosophers subsequently built on his ideas. However, 
failure to appreciate the source of these ideas has weakened their impact, being scattered among 
different disciplines by diverse philosophers and scientists who drew upon Bergson’s work while 
forgetting details of his philosophy. This article is an effort to rectify this situation. 
KEYWORDS: Henri Bergson; Cartesian Dualism; Mind; Matter; Memory; Temporality; Process 
Philosophy 
 
INTRODUCTION   
Inspired by a tradition of thought going back to Friedrich Schelling, Henri 
Bergson's central concern was to overcome the Cartesian tradition of thought. 
This not only had rendered the relationship between mental and physical 
existence unintelligible but had engendered within philosophy the dualism 
between idealism and materialism. To this end, Bergson proposed not only a 
radically new conception of both the nature of mind and the nature of matter, 
but also a radically new conception of philosophical method. His work has been 
profoundly influential, although his influence is seldom fully acknowledged. 
Those strongly influenced by him include William James, John Dewey, Conwy 
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Lloyd Morgan, A.N. Whitehead and thereby those indirectly influenced by him, 
Aleksandr Bogdanov and Mikhail Bakhtin in Russia, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund 
Husserl and Matin Heidegger in Germany, in France, Gabriel Marcel, Gaston 
Bachelard, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilbert Simondon, Gilles Deleuze and 
Cornelius Castoriadis and those influenced by them, and Jean Piaget, Louis de 
Broglie, Ilya Prigogine and Karl Pribram among leading scientists. Failure to 
acknowledge Bergson’s influence is evident in the development of German 
philosophy where Bergson’s insights on temporality were appropriated without 
acknowledging them,1 and in in French philosophy where Bergson’s insights on 
embodiment had a major influence on phenomenologists without their source 
being acknowledged. As the phenomenologist Richard Zaner observed in the 
epilogue to his work on embodiment: 
Although neither Marcel, Sartre nor Merleau-Ponty has apparently noted this, it 
was Bergson who first saw, with great insight, the genuine significance and 
peculiarity of the body, and the necessity of re-formulating the question of the 
relations between mind and body in terms of an analysis of the human body.2 
This failure is also evident in some of the scientists and mathematicians who were 
directly or indirectly influenced by Bergson, although original scientists have 
been more generous in paying respects to Bergson.3  
To properly appreciate the achievements of those whom Bergson influenced 
and their contributions to philosophy, and thereby to challenge the ways of 
thinking currently dominating our culture more effectively, it is necessary to 
properly understand Bergson’s own philosophy. Bergson claimed to be 
developing a new method. What was this new philosophical method? Did it 
enable Bergson to reconceive mind and matter in such a way that their 
relationship could be made intelligible? I will suggest here that to a considerable 
extent, it did. 
 
1 See Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, eds. ‘The Concept of Time’, in Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail 
of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007, ch.16. 
2 Richard M. Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment, 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972: 243 
3 See P.A.Y. Gunther, ed. Bergson and the Evolution of Physics, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 
1969; Milič Čapek, Bergson and Modern Physics. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971; and Andrew C. Papanicolaou and 
Pete A.Y. Gunter, eds. Bergson and Modern Thought, ed., Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987. 
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TOWARD A POST-CARTESIAN METHOD 
For Bergson, the dualism between mind and body is unavoidable so long as we 
follow Descartes in viewing matter as extended while denying extension to the 
mind. There is no conceivable way that mind could influence matter if this is the 
case. It is this impossibility which has led people to uphold an idealist or 
materialist monism, denying reality to the material world or to the realm of 
experience. The core belief of materialist monism, which presently prevails, is 
that there is one order of events, the physical, and that mental phenomena are 
either unreal, causally inefficacious or another way of looking at physical 
processes. Bergson argued that the differences between these positions are trivial: 
For whether, indeed, thought is regarded as a mere function of the brain and the 
state of consciousness as an epiphenomena of the state of the brain, or whether 
mental states and brain states are held to be two versions, in two different 
languages, of the same original, in either case it is laid down that, could we 
penetrate into the inside of a brain at work and behold the dance of the atoms 
which make up the cortex, and if, on the other hand, we possessed the key to 
psycho-physiology, we should know every detail of what is going on in the 
corresponding consciousness.4 
There is no place for consciousness to influence the course of events. 
However, for Bergson, the intractability of the problem rests not with the 
empirical data, nor the lack of internal consistency in these explanatory schemes, 
but in the method of inquiry itself. This method of inquiry privileges logico-
mathematical thought. Logic is essentially a finite set of rules which operate on 
and strictly determine the behaviour of symbols characterized by discreteness, 
simplicity and permanence. The discreteness of symbols enables them to be 
rearranged in imaginary space, while their simplicity and permanence renders 
them immutable and timeless. While the rules of logic allow for infinite 
rearrangement of symbols, the system of all possible logical relations is given 
timelessly. All of the infinitely many possible permutations and combinations are 
strictly determined and contained in the rules and elements of the system. 
Privileging this logic and applying it rigorously to physical and experiential 
phenomena requires that genuine temporality in which there is real creativity in 
 
4 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, [1896] trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1911, xi. 
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becoming, qualitative heterogeneity and freedom from necessity, must be denied 
categorically. Time is reduced to a dimension of space. 
Applying this logic to psychological phenomena requires the identification of 
discrete, simple and permanent components: affective states, percepts, concepts, 
memories, 'overt, discriminant responses', 'subliminal experiential infinitesimals', 
phonemes, sememes, or whatever. These are required to apply mathematics to 
explore the realm of possibilities and to make predictions among these 
possibilities. But the simplicity of these elements is problematic. How can a 
percept such as 'blue', a concept such as 'above', and an affection such as 'anxiety' 
be reduced to different configurations of the same fundamental units? To solve 
this problem, we are led to a reductionism which explains the apparent 
qualitative multiplicity of psychological states in terms of distinct configurations 
of homogeneous physico-chemical events located within the brain. As far as 
memory is concerned, either the brain manufactures and then stores percepts in 
the way space contains objects, or it manufactures and then stores patterns of 
electrochemical activity to which epiphenomenal percepts accrue as mere 
shadows. Effectively, conscious agency disappears. 
Bergson saw the model for an alternative philosophical method in the 
development of the infinitesimal calculus. Embracing 'infinite regress', quantities 
that 'tend toward zero', 'passages to the limit', mathematical forms banished as 
impurities by the Ancient Greeks, 'becoming', 'change' and 'process' were 
incorporated into mathematical thought. The calculus introduced a new manner 
of thinking. Instead of employing static concepts, static concepts are represented 
as a limiting case of the calculus. The straight line becomes a particular case of 
the curve, the circle a particular case of the ellipse, each number becomes a value 
obtained by reduction through an infinity of processes. Movement is taken 
directly into account rather than being a 'by-product' of stability. And since there 
can be no motion without unfolding in time, this is a temporal rationality. 
Reflecting on calculus, Bergson wrote:  
To philosophize is to invert the habitual direction of the work of thought. ... The 
most powerful method of investigation which the human mind possesses, the 
infinitesimal calculus, is born of this very inversion. Modern mathematics is 
precisely an effort to substitute that which is making itself for that which is already 
made, to follow the generation of magnitudes, to seize motion, no longer from 
without and in its completed result but from within and in its tendency to change, 
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finally to adopt the mobile continuity of the outline of things.5 
However, Bergson did not conclude from this that through mathematics we 
could grasp the reality of time. Even the calculus ultimately reduces the world to 
discrete, simple and permanent components. The infinitesimal units of time, the 
'dt's', are intervals consisting of an infinity of mutually external instants. Time is 
geometrized and motion is visualized as a static series of points. This leads back 
to a deterministic, 'block' universe in which real time, time as durational 
becoming, is eliminated. So, Bergson argued, metaphysics 'in no way will move 
by this [method] towards a universal mathematics, that chimera of modern 
philosophy. Quite the contrary, the farther it will go on this path the more it will 
re-encounter objects still more untranslatable into symbols.'6 What is called for, 
according to Bergson, is a radicalization of this method, to call into question all 
fixed concepts and objects and to think in fluid concepts and follow the contours 
of temporally unfolding reality. 
Bergson called this method 'intuition' as opposed to analysis, a term for which 
he was condemned by Bertrand Russell and others as anti-intellectual. While 
analysis grasps reality from the outside through comparisons and ratios, intuition 
attempts to grasp reality from the 'inside'. Contrasting the two, Bergson wrote: 
By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself 
within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently 
inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object 
to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other 
objects. To analyse, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other 
than itself.7 
From this it should be clear that 'intuition' is not anti-intellectual but amounts 
to a generalization of the notion of 'empathy' thereby corresponding to Michael 
Polanyi's notion of 'indwelling'. However, Bergson also made the point that this 
method is 'autological', that is, understanding things in their own terms rather 
than 'heterological': explaining things through something else, and that such 
autological understanding involves (as Dilthey came to realize in his last works) 
appreciating things in their durational becoming, thinking 'in duration'. 
 
5 Bergson, The Creative Mind, N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1946, p.224-225. 
6 Ibid. p.225f. 
7 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulme, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955. 
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MIND 
Bergson first applied such 'intuition' to the mind. To begin with, conscious 
experience appears to form a series of states, distinct from previous and 
subsequent ones to which it is linked by external associative links. But such 
discreteness is an illusion created by projecting onto it the logical assumptions 
and symbolic diagrams deriving from language, diagrams which have become 
for us reality itself. Intuitive effort reveals behind such discrete states successive 
phases of psychological becoming flowing smoothly into one another in a way 
which cannot be decomposed into a series of juxtaposed motionless moments. 
The content of experience is then revealed by greater intuitive effort to be pure 
temporality, a temporality in which the past survives in the present. As Bergson 
put it: 
[C]onsciousness signifies, before everything, memory. At this moment that I am 
conversing with you, I pronounce the word 'conversation'. Clearly my 
consciousness presents the word all at once, otherwise it would not be a whole word, 
and would not convey a single meaning. Yet, when I pronounced the last syllable 
of the word, the three first have already been pronounced; they are past with regard 
to the last one, which must then be called the present. But I did not pronounce this 
last syllable 'tion' instantaneously. The time, however short, during which I uttered 
it is decomposable into parts, and all of these parts are past in relation to the last 
among them. This last would be the definitive present, were it not, in its turn, 
decomposable. So that however you try, you cannot draw a line between the past 
and the present, nor consequently between memory and consciousness.8 
Since 'immediate' 'recent' and 'remote' are relative terms, it is evident that it is not 
only the 'immediate' past which is preserved in the present, but the whole past 
merges with the present.  
The present in turn is new and absolutely unique, creatively advancing into 
the future. As Bergson suggested: 
Let us seek, in the depths of our experience, the point where we feel ourselves most 
intimately within our own life. It is into pure duration that we then plunge back, a 
duration in which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present 
that is absolutely new. But, at the same time, we feel the spring of our will strained 
to its utmost limit. We must, by a strong recoil of our personality on itself, gather 
up our past while it is slipping away, in order to thrust it, compact and undivided, 
 
8 Bergson, Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays, London: Macmillan, 1920, p.69 
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into a present which it will create by entering.9  
Such coincidence of oneself with itself admits of degrees, and we never 
completely possess ourselves. But to the extent that we do so possess ourselves, 
we are truly free. 
MATTER 
For materialists, such reflections have nothing to do with reality which, if it can 
be known at all, can only be known through the logico-mathematical methods of 
science. In opposition to this sentiment, Bergson suggests that we should also 
apply the method of intuition to the realm of matter. Physical processes are 
characterized by histories which coincide with portions of physical durations. If 
the essence of duration in consciousness is memory, might not memory also be 
involved in material processes?  
Traditionally, duration in the physical world has not been taken seriously, and 
no need has been felt to postulate such a memory. If sugar dissolves in water, the 
time which elapses is nothing more than the time it takes for the sugar atoms to 
rearrange themselves. Time is an artifact of the rearrangement of the immutable 
elements. But this way of thinking again follows from the projection onto nature 
of the logical order defining the relations between discrete, simple and immutable 
symbols. But through intuition, grasping matter from the inside, particles cannot 
be seen as immutable and their movement a succession of immobilities. Their 
endurance requires explanation, and the only possible explanation is recourse to 
some type of memory.  
To justify this view, Bergson critically examined the prevailing conception of 
the physical world. At that time, continuity was attributed to energy only. The 
cohesion of matter was attributed to energy or immaterial forces. Such continuity 
was seen as spatial, downplaying the temporal continuity associated with wave 
motion of light. Corpuscles, despite their hypothetical status, were taken to be 
the true constituents of physical reality rather than wave motion. Bergson 
rejected the bias in favour of corpuscles and defended the priority of wave 
motion, heralded the equivalence of matter and energy and asserted the 
 
9 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell, Lanham: University Press of America, 1983, p.199-
200. 
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historical continuity of nature implicit in the undulatory conception of energy 
and consequently of matter. He argued that: 
...the atom dissolves more and more under the eyes of the physicist.... We may still 
speak of atoms; the atom may even retain its individuality for our mind which 
isolates it; but the solidity and the inertia of the atom dissolve either into movements 
or into lines of force whose reciprocal solidarity brings back to us universal 
continuity.... For Faraday the atom is a centre of force. He means by this that the 
individuality of the atom consists in the mathematical point at which cross, 
radiating throughout space, the infinite lines of force which really constitute it: thus 
each atom occupies the whole space to which gravitation extends and all atoms are 
interpenetrating. ... [V]ortices and lines of force ... show us, pervading concrete 
extensity, modifications, perturbations, changes of tension of energy, and nothing else.10 
Where the wave replaces the corpuscle as the ultimate constituent of the 
material universe, space or extension, central to the definition of a corpuscle, has 
become somewhat nebulous, while time, irrelevant to the definition of a 
corpuscle, is indispensable for the definition of the wave. In order to obtain the 
equivalent of the classic corpuscle one has to consider the whole duration of an 
undulation as it develops diachronically. Time, no longer the abstract 
mathematical time of classical physics, enters into the definition of substance. 
There are a number of implications to this vision of matter. The spatiality of 
matter is no longer equivalent to geometrical extensity - matter can never become 
momentarily stationary. Also, where time is concrete, embedded in different 
strata of matter each of which may exhibit its own tempo of motion, the notion 
of a present moment that extends simultaneously throughout the universe is 
inapplicable to reality. And since perfect deducibility of effects from anterior 
causes presupposes discrete and homogeneous quantities which do not exist in 
the probabilistic, continuous universe with qualitatively heterogeneous aspects, 
determinism must be rejected. Finally, there are no discrete macroscopic objects 
which could be posited as the objective reality against which percepts could be 
measured. Percepts could not be pictures of objects because objects as such do 
not exist. So how can the becoming of a wave or the becoming of all matter be 
conceived? How can the 'before' and 'present' of the universe be asserted without 
the eternality of its constituents? It is here that the notion of memory must be 
 
10 Bergson, Matter and Memory, pp.263-267. 
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invoked as an explanatory principle. 
A wave unfolding in time occupies a certain depth of duration. For it to exist 
its immediate past must persist into the present to conjointly define it. This is a 
form of proto-memory. To construe a wave as involving a proto-memory in this 
way is not to project psychic qualities onto the physical world or to invoke the 
notion of an omniscient spirit which beholds the history of things. It is required 
to make sense of the notions of before and after; that is, to make sense of time. As 
Bergson put it: '[I]t is impossible to distinguish between the duration, however 
short it may be, that separates two instants and the memory that connects them, 
because duration is essentially a continuation of what no longer exists into what 
does exist.'11 
MATTER AND MIND 
For Bergson, pure extension without duration and pure duration without 
extension are two unrealizable limit cases. All that exists can be characterized in 
terms of its participation in both extension and duration. And with matter and 
consciousness no longer defined in mutually exclusive terms, the relationship 
between them can be made intelligible. Inert matter corresponds to maximum 
extension and a minimum of what Bergson calls 'durational tension'. Extension 
becomes progressively less significant and duration progressively more central in 
organic matter, primitive sensory-motor activity, concrete human perception, 
abstract thinking and then with various levels of intuition where we approach 
maximum durational tension. Bergson identified duration with spirit. 
In such a world sentient organisms can no longer be described as perceiving 
an external world by a sequence of transformations beginning with stimuli input, 
which is a code on the real object, and ending with an extensionless picture of 
that object in the brain. From a Bergsonian perspective, the distinctness, 
individuality and reality of objects becomes nebulous; they dissolve into a spatio-
temporal process of universal becoming. The problem of perception has to be 
reconceived as, How are objects as perceived carved out of this universal, 
durational becoming? And how does personal consciousness arise in the midst of 
impersonal universal becoming?  
 
11 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, p.49. 
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Any hypothetically isolated region of matter is present in that it enters into 
calculable relations with all other regions similarly isolated. Correspondingly, it 
may be said that the region 'perceives', or that the totality of the universe is 
represented for that region, in that within its duration, the action of all other 
regions is momentarily incorporated. It can be called conscious representation in 
that the diverse rhythms of duration which co-exist in nature are momentarily 
incorporated in, or adapted to, the durational rhythm that characterizes the 
region in question.  
For Bergson, living organisms are not merely hypothetical segments of the 
universal becoming but true individuals. To the degree they partake of matter, 
their conduct towards any other part of the world is identical to that of any other 
region. However, living organisms are defined by their ability to exclude most 
types and favour other types of environmental influence, and then to respond 
selectively to these. Such responses are not instantaneous but are characterized 
by hesitation or delay which at times can be indefinitely prolonged, and 
organisms are able to respond differently to the same stimuli while responding 
identically to different stimuli. The organism thereby becomes a centre of novelty, 
placing it in a variable rather than constant relationship with the world.  
These three attributes are aspects of the one fundamental property: 
organisms are centres of greater 'durational tension' involving greater 'mnemic 
span'. The selected region of becoming that is called the stimulus aggregate is 
condensed by the organism and transformed to follow the existential rhythm of 
the organism's duration. The distinction between and relationship between 
subject and object becomes temporal rather than spatial. As Bergson put it: 
In the space of a second, red light ... accomplishes 400 billions of successive 
vibrations... In short, then, to perceive consists in condensing enormous periods of 
infinitely diluted existence into a few more differentiated moments of an intenser 
life, and in thus summing up a very long history. To perceive means to immobilize.12 
Representations are not pictures of reality but that part of the totality, being of 
vital importance to the organism, which is delineated, immobilized and detached 
from the rest of reality as a percept.  
The representation of the influences to which a primitive organism such as 
 
12 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p.275. 
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an amoeba selectively responds according to their importance to its survival is 
not inside the membrane but is extended over the surface which constitute the 
limits of its body. Representation is equivalent to this discernment; the 
detachment of these influences from the continuity of the world effected by the 
selective action. According to Bergson, the relationship between presence and 
representation is not fundamentally different when organisms have complex 
cerebral centres. Complex cerebral centres generate a greater tension of duration 
which separates the organism further from the immediately surrounding world 
and from immediate action. Perception is still a process of selective action which 
immobilizes the duration of processes and disengages them from the totality of 
the universe. That is, the brain functions as an instrument of selective activity 
which limits rather than produces percepts. A percept is still defined as that part 
of the universal becoming that interests the vital function of the perceiver; it is 
still part of the present world although it now owes its particular form to the more 
complex selective action made possible by the brain. Through such increased 
selectivity the distance and the number of regions of reality that can appeal to the 
perceiver's action are increased, and reaction, instead of being actually 
materialized as movement, can dissipate as a nascent plan of movement. This 
involves active attention as compared to the automatic mode of perceptual 
activity which is pre-attentive. 
The many qualities which cohere to form a percept for people, such as 
texture, colour, smell etc. are held by Bergson to be properties of the external 
world, and the cerebral mechanism simply condense these qualities and adapt 
them to the specifically human rhythm of duration. As he put it,  
my perception is indeed truly within me, since it contracts into a single moment of 
my duration that which, taken in itself, spreads over an incalculable number of 
moments.... In just the same way the multitudinous successive positions of a runner 
are contracted into a single symbolic attitude, which our eyes perceive, which art 
reproduces, and which becomes for us all the image of a man running.13  
How could this interpretation allow for diverse specialized organs within the 
brain? According to Bergson, the purpose of the different sensory mechanisms, 
including the peripheral organs, the cortical projection areas, and their 
 
13 Ibid. p.p.276-277. 
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connections, is to accommodate distinct sets of qualities, already present as so 
many existential rhythms co-existing in nature, to durational rhythms which 
characterize the various percept types, whether visual, auditory or whatever. To 
account for how each sensory mechanism contributes to the coordination of these 
qualities such that a cohesive percept may arise, Bergson suggested that an organ 
of sense 'is constructed precisely with a view to allowing a plurality of 
simultaneous excitants to impress it in a certain order and in a certain way, by 
distributing themselves, all at one time, over selected portions of its surface.' He 
went on: 'It is like an immense keyboard, on which the external object executes 
at once its harmony of a thousand notes, thus calling forth in a definite order, and 
at a single moment, a great multitude of elementary sensations corresponding to 
all the points of the sensory centre that are concerned.'14 
MEMORY AND MIND 
So far we have been only considering what Bergson calls 'pure perception', the 
type of perception associated with being 'absorbed in the present and capable, by 
giving up every form of memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate 
and instantaneous.'15 The abstraction from memory was designed to reveal how 
perception in general is possible without being subjective; to show what living 
matter is capable of achieving without the benefit of personal, conscious, memory 
images, and to reveal the limits and specify the role of the nervous system as a 
material organ in actual perception. But this is an abstraction. As Bergson 
argued, 'Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; 
it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it.'16 It 
is through memory that past actions guide what is selected by present perception. 
And it is through memory impregnating actual perceptions that the qualities of 
objects appear to be ours, and perception takes on its subjective quality. For 
Bergson, memory is the key to understanding mind, and it is perhaps no 
coincidence that, as Karl Pribram has noted, the English word 'mind' is derived 
from the same root as is 'memory': 'mynden'.17 
 
14 Ibid. p.165. 
15 Ibid. p.26. 
16 Ibid. p.170. 
17 Karl H. Pribram, 'Bergson and the Brain', in Bergson and Modern Thought, ed. Andrew C. Papanicolaou and 
Pete A.Y. Gunter, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987, p.164. 
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Pure memory, memory associated with the durational becoming of the 
universe, cannot be known directly but only through intuition of one's own 
duration. Bergson is opposed to the idea that memory must be ‘spatialized', that 
is, that memories must be seen as located somewhere in space. He accepted that 
the nervous system in being adapted to life can store within itself past sensori-
motor sequences as functional or structural modifications. However, rejecting the 
reduction of all memory to such modifications, Bergson hypothesized a 
distinction between habit memory and image memory. 'The past', he wrote, 
'survives under two distinct forms: first, in motor mechanisms; secondly in 
independent recollections.'18  
Habit memory is memory associated with motor mechanisms. Examples 
include not only practical skills, but also verbal material learned by rote. Habit 
memory is acquired by repetition to become an automated sequence and requires 
effort. It is not subject to arbitrary abbreviations. Although one might have an 
abbreviated image of this automated sequence, this image belongs to the memory 
proper and is not part of the mechanism itself. Habit is a property of the nervous 
system and subject to all the perils to which sustaining the system is exposed. 
Representational memories, on the other hand, are single-trial acquisitions. 
A percept at any given portion of psychological duration is a unique and non-
repeatable phenomenon. Although recollections appear distinct and external to 
each other, they are inextricably embedded in the totality of memory much like 
external objects are encased in the continuity of the material universe. The 
immobilization and the disengagement of both percepts from the material 
universe and recollections from memory is, according to Bergson, the work of the 
nervous system. In fact, it is the only contribution of the nervous system to the 
genesis of percepts and recollections. Forgetting indicates the inadequacy of the 
nervous system to sustain the carving-out of concrete recollections within the 
ever-evolving totality of pure memory. 
Underlying both habit memory and representational memory is the capacity 
to recognize. Recall is a doubtful form of knowledge of the past; but recognition 
is much more persuasive because all learning, all conscious perception and all 
concept formation would be inexplicable in its absence. Without recognition, past 
 
18 Bergson, Matter and Memory, p.87. 
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experience would be absent. Basic to any epistemology must be an account of the 
mechanism of recognition. Prior to Bergson most philosophers were either 
nominalists, treating concepts as developing through comparison to reveal what 
is common in percepts, or 'conceptualists' treating concepts as given a priori to be 
discovered as part of reality or revealed as built into the apparatus of perception. 
Bergson developed a new theory, rejecting the spectator view of percepts and 
concepts he saw these as developing through the organism’s effort to adapt to its 
world. Objects perceived or percepts are not 'inside' the perceiver. What is inside 
the brain is the neuroelectric diagram which prolongs the influence of the world. 
This diagram is neither the code on the object nor the code on the response but 
an amalgam of both. There is only one pattern, one diagram which is evoked by 
a variety of external sources of influence to the degree that these are selected 
from the continuity of the world process by virtue of their being relevant to the 
same vital need. So, while concepts emerge from percepts, as the nominalists 
argued, there is no question of comparisons between percepts. As Bergson 
argued: 
It is grass in general which attracts the herbivorous animal: the colour and smell of 
the grass, felt and experienced as forces, (we do not go so far as to say, thought as 
qualities of genera) are the sole immediate data of its external perception. On this 
background of generality or of resemblance the animal's memory may show up 
contrasts from which will issue differentiations; it will then distinguish one 
countryside from another, one field from another; but this is, we repeat, the 
superfluity of perception, not a necessary part.19 
Concrete objects are the end product, not the point of origin, of the 
perceptual process. Recognition of the similarity of objects should not be treated 
as a psychological process. As Bergson continued: 
...there is no essential difference between the process by which this acid picks out 
from the salt its base, and the act of the plant which invariably extracts from the 
most diverse soils those elements that serve to nourish it. Make one more step; 
imagine a rudimentary consciousness such as that of an amoeba in a drop of water; 
it will be sensible of the resemblance, and not of the difference, in the various 
organic substances which it can assimilate. In short, we can follow from the mineral 
to the plant, from the plant to the simplest conscious beings, from the animal to 
man, the progress of the operation by which things and beings seize from out their 
 
19 Ibid. p.206. 
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surroundings that which attracts them, that which interests them practically, 
without needing any effort of abstraction, simply because the rest of their 
surroundings takes no hold upon them.20 
In human consciousness, the differences leading to separation and 
solidification of objects-as-perceived are developed as a habit memory, are only 
noticed after pre-attentive recognition has taken place. Notice of these objects 
involves representational memory and attentional effort, leading to memory-
images (episodes) 'recorded' in the course of their formation. According to 
Bergson it is through such reflective perception, reflection on the objects-as-
perceived, that we have developed logic and mathematical thought.  
This whole process has been studied by Piaget who received his basic ideas 
from Bergson, without properly acknowledging the source of his research 
program. Following Bergson, Piaget argued that the cognitive system is a 
specialized instrument of adaptation and that it is a direct extension of other 
biological instruments of adaptation. The newborn infant's environment and self 
form an uninterrupted continuity which is severed later in development and is 
followed by the compartmentalization of the environment into a multitude of 
discrete and permanent objects. Piaget asserted the active nature of early 
perceptual achievements, showing how the ability to experience the world as a 
world of objects emerges through interaction with the world. Objects are first 
defined with reference to motor schemata and there is no separation of the 
sensory and motor components of the perceptual act. Manipulable objects, 
including the self, are then seen to arrange themselves in a common space and to 
remain invariant therein unless their configuration and position is modified by 
an action or through the application of a force external to them. The properties 
of these objects and the regularity of their modifications first comprehended with 
reference to concrete perceptual-motor operations are subsequently internalized. 
In this way the concrete operations are idealized into abstract logical rules. The 
perceptual relations among real objects become logical relations of possible 
objects which people are able to explore through formal logic and mathematics. 
It is this that Piaget regarded as their highest form of intellectual development, 
the stage of 'formal operations'.  
 
20 Ibid. p.207f. 
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But while Piaget fully developed Bergson's insights into the practical source 
of logic-mathematical thinking, he did not draw Bergson's conclusion from this, 
that such logico-mathematical thinking, while being eminently adapted for 
action and for controlling the world, tends to hide the true nature of reality. He 
gave no place to 'intuition' or 'empathy' or to the creative becoming revealed 
through such intuition. Bergson, by contrast, saw the higher stages of intellectual 
development as habit memory being conjoined with memory images associated 
with duration. For Bergson, when mental images partaking of pure duration 
interact with cerebral automatisms or habit memories, we have an attentive 
recognition which can interrupt or arrest automated habitual activities, allowing 
for real freedom of thought and action. According to Bergson, concepts are not 
preserved either by motor habits or in duration, but are created anew each time 
by the confluence of verbal automatisms and images which, increasing 
perpetually in number and variety, make for their contextual, inter-personal, and 
age-dependent variability. In short, Bergson gave a place to the creative diversity 
of human thought.  
To justify the distinction between habit memory and image memory 
associated with duration and to show the autonomy of image memory from the 
brain and thereby to justify his notion of human freedom, Bergson made a study 
of aphasias and other psychological disorders. According to Andrew 
Papanicolaou, Bergson's analysis of these disorders still stands up, and Bergson's 
theory accounts for the phenomena at least as well as any other theory and better 
than most.21 However, it is not the empirical studies which have raised questions 
and doubts, but what Bergson means by an episodic image memory associated 
with duration relatively free from cerebral activity, and explaining how such an 
image memory could affect cerebral activity and affect what people do. 
To comprehend Bergson's claim, it is necessary to consider again his notion 
of durational tension defining the different levels of becoming. For Bergson, 
different durational tension is a measure of the power of acting.22 Greater tension 
is also associated with greater mnemic span. The immateriality of image-memory 
or memory proper consists in the enormously higher tension of the same species 
 
21 Andrew C. Papanicolaou, 'Bergson's Psycho-Physical Theory' in Bergson and Modern Thought, pp.56-128. 
22 Bergson, Mind Energy, pp.16-17. 
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of duration which defines matter in general and cerebral automatisms in 
particular. If material processes themselves are essentially durational, to say that 
memory can affect cerebral automatisms is analogous to claiming that a magnetic 
fields can affect the atoms of iron rods, except that instead of interacting by virtue 
of both partaking of spatiality, memories and cerebral automatisms interact by 
virtue of both partaking of duration. What is involved is evident if we consider 
how the thoughts and actions of a person awake are temporally ordered in 
contrast to their thoughts when asleep when their tension of consciousness is at a 
minimum. The absurdities and contradictions of dream images are realized only 
after awakening, i.e., with the restoration of the normal tension of consciousness 
and mnemic span. In waking life, the longer mnemic span associated with a 
higher durational tension orders the becoming of their lives so that actions or 
utterances cohere. 
CONCLUSION 
Bergson wrote his major works more than a century ago, before the development 
of relativity theory, quantum theory and non-linear thermodynamics, at least on 
some interpretations, confirmed his characterization of matter. Since then the 
ideas he put forward have been further developed, both by those directly or 
indirectly influenced by him, and also by people who have developed similar 
ideas independently. By virtue of these developments it is possible to reformulate 
many of Bergson's ideas into a more cogent form. However, it is in Bergson's 
writings that the problems of Cartesian thought were most fully confronted and 
the relationship between the ideas needed to overcome them most clearly 
indicated. My contention is that whatever problems there are in Bergson's 
philosophy, his work provides a reference point which enables us to relate and 
understand the significance of the most vital developments in the humanities and 
both the natural and the humans sciences at the beginning of the new millennia.  
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